Knowledge changes over time. Lamarck's worldview over-took the Creationist's view of biology, which, in turn, was replaced by Darwin's. Quantum mechanics has superseded Newton's classical mechanics. The cognitive revolution in psychology has left the behaviorists in the dust. Every time, a new model, offering more intension, control, predictability and falsifiability replaces the old, less scientific one. At the heart of these revolutions is anomalistics.
Anomalistics has two central features. First, its concerns are purely scientific. It deals only with empirical claims of the extraordinary and is not concerned with alleged metaphysical, theological or supernatural phenomena. As such, it insists on the testability of claims (including both verifiability and falsifiability), seeks parsimonious explanations, places the burden of proof on the claimant, and expects evidence of a claim to be commensurate with its degree of extra ordinariness (anomalousness). Though it recognizes that unexplained phenomena exist, it does not presume these are unexplainable but seeks to discover old or to develop new appropriate scientific explanations.
As a scientific enterprise, anomalistics is normatively skeptical and demands inquiry prior to judgment, but skepticism means doubt rather than denial (which is itself a claim, a negative one, for which science also demands proof). Though claims without adequate evidence are usually unproved, this is not confused with evidence of disproof. As meteorologists have noted, an absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence. Since science must remain an open system capable of modification with new evidence, anomalistics seeks to keep the door ajar even for the most radical claimants willing to engage in scientific discourse. is approach recognizes the need to avoid both the Type I error - thinking something special is happening when it really is not - and the Type II error - thinking nothing special is happening when something special, perhaps rare, actually occurs. While recognizing that a legitimate anomaly may constitute a crisis for conventional theories in science, anomalistics also sees them as an opportunity for progressive change in science. Thus, anomalies are viewed not as nuisances but as welcome discoveries that may lead to the expansion of our scientific understanding.
The anomalist tries to avoid both Type I and II errors, errors in deductive reasoning, as well as informal fallacies and cognitive biases. It is this balance between dismissing nonsense while being open-minded that the anomalist constantly strives for. The thin line separating protoscience from scientism (that is, pseudoscience) is where the anomalists find themselves drawn to. Marcello Truzzi, a former professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, has written extensively on the anomalistic perspective.
The anomalist tries to avoid both Type I and II errors, errors in deductive reasoning, as well as informal fallacies and cognitive biases. It is this balance between dismissing nonsense while being open-minded that the anomalist constantly strives for. The thin line separating protoscience from scientism (that is, pseudoscience) is where the anomalists find themselves drawn to. Marcello Truzzi, a former professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, has written extensively on the anomalistic perspective.
This echoes Wittgenstein's admonishment that "[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Sadly, today new ideas (perhaps revolutionary ones) are often subject to ridicule, ad hominem attacks, and scientism, instead of being granted a respectful agnostic silence. Type I errors are commonly debunked (which is great), while Type II errors are mostly ignored or ridiculed, ultimately remaining uninvestigated (which is not so great).
Anomalistics has two central features. First, its concerns are purely scientific. It deals only with empirical claims of the extraordinary and is not concerned with alleged metaphysical, theological or supernatural phenomena. As such, it insists on the testability of claims (including both verifiability and falsifiability), seeks parsimonious explanations, places the burden of proof on the claimant, and expects evidence of a claim to be commensurate with its degree of extra ordinariness (anomalousness). Though it recognizes that unexplained phenomena exist, it does not presume these are unexplainable but seeks to discover old or to develop new appropriate scientific explanations.
As a scientific enterprise, anomalistics is normatively skeptical and demands inquiry prior to judgment, but skepticism means doubt rather than denial (which is itself a claim, a negative one, for which science also demands proof). Though claims without adequate evidence are usually unproved, this is not confused with evidence of disproof. As meteorologists have noted, an absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence. Since science must remain an open system capable of modification with new evidence, anomalistics seeks to keep the door ajar even for the most radical claimants willing to engage in scientific discourse. is approach recognizes the need to avoid both the Type I error - thinking something special is happening when it really is not - and the Type II error - thinking nothing special is happening when something special, perhaps rare, actually occurs. While recognizing that a legitimate anomaly may constitute a crisis for conventional theories in science, anomalistics also sees them as an opportunity for progressive change in science. Thus, anomalies are viewed not as nuisances but as welcome discoveries that may lead to the expansion of our scientific understanding.
The anomalist tries to avoid both Type I and II errors, errors in deductive reasoning, as well as informal fallacies and cognitive biases. It is this balance between dismissing nonsense while being open-minded that the anomalist constantly strives for. The thin line separating protoscience from scientism (that is, pseudoscience) is where the anomalists find themselves drawn to. Marcello Truzzi, a former professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, has written extensively on the anomalistic perspective.
The anomalist tries to avoid both Type I and II errors, errors in deductive reasoning, as well as informal fallacies and cognitive biases. It is this balance between dismissing nonsense while being open-minded that the anomalist constantly strives for. The thin line separating protoscience from scientism (that is, pseudoscience) is where the anomalists find themselves drawn to. Marcello Truzzi, a former professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, has written extensively on the anomalistic perspective.
This echoes Wittgenstein's admonishment that "[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Sadly, today new ideas (perhaps revolutionary ones) are often subject to ridicule, ad hominem attacks, and scientism, instead of being granted a respectful agnostic silence. Type I errors are commonly debunked (which is great), while Type II errors are mostly ignored or ridiculed, ultimately remaining uninvestigated (which is not so great).
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